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Wilders: Wilders: Standing on Hallowed Ground

Standing on Hallowed Ground: Should the
Federal Judiciary Monitor Executive
Violations of the Establishment Clause?
Freedomfrom Religion Foundation,Inc. vs. Chao1

I. INTRODUCTION
The standing doctrine is a threshold inquiry into whether a court has the
power to hear the claims brought by a particular party. 2 Motivated by a desire
to reach the merits of a higher number of cases under the Establishment
Clause, the Supreme Court created an exception to the traditional standing
doctrine known as Flast standing, after the case from which it originated,
which allows a taxpayer to challenge congressional appropriations that allegedly violate the Establishment Clause. However, despite the Court's efforts,
the limited nature of the Flast doctrine, coupled with the normative requirement that a plaintiff suffer injury-in-fact, continues to limit the number of
Establishment Clause claims that can be resolved on the merits. In Freedom
from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Chao,3 the Seventh Circuit incrementally

expanded taxpayer standing to include challenges to executive branch funding of programs created by the President.
This Note argues that the Seventh Circuit reached the correct result.
However, there is little logic in continuing to limit Establishment Clause adjudications to plaintiffs who can show injury-in-fact or, absent such injury,
plaintiffs who can claim the allegedly unconstitutional act was an exercise of
the Taxing and Spending Clause. Instead, because the Establishment Clause
is a unique structural restraint which separates the government from organized religion4 and prohibits government support of religion that divides the
political process along religious lines, this Note concludes that standing to sue
for Establishment Clause violations should be extended to acts of any government power.

1. 433 F.3d 989 (7th Cir. 2006).

2. 13 CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER,
§ 3531 (2d ed. 1984).
3. Freedomfrom Religion Found., 433 F.3d 989.
4. Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint on Government Power, 84 IOWA L. REv. 1, 61 (1998).
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
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II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Through executive orders, President George W. Bush created a program
commonly known as Faith-Based and Community Initiatives. 5 Although
faith-based and community groups have provided social services to people in

need for years, the federal government was often unwilling to partner with
these groups. 6 President Bush's program was aimed at reversing that practice,7 and the President funded conferences to promote the program through
executive agencies. 8 The conferences "provide[d] participants with information about the Federal funding process, available funding opportunities, and
the requirements that come with the receipt of Federal funds."9 These seminars allowed "thousands of grassroots organizations" to receive training in the
Federal grant process, and hundreds of new organizations have successfully
received Federal funds to perform their social service functions. 10 This law-

5. Exec. Order No. 13,199, 66 Fed. Reg. 8499, 8499 (Jan. 31, 2001)
(There is established a White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives (White House OFBCI) within the Executive Office of the
President that will have lead responsibility in the executive branch to establish policies, priorities, and objectives for the Federal Government's
comprehensive effort to enlist, equip, enable, empower, and expand the
work of faith-based and other community organizations to the extent
permitted by law.); Freedomfrom Religion Found., 433 F.3d at 993.
6. Freedomfrom Religion Found., 433 F.3d at 993.
7. Faith-based and other community organizations are indispensable in meeting
the needs of poor Americans and distressed neighborhoods. Government cannot be
replaced by such organizations, but it can and should welcome them as partners. The
paramount goal is compassionate results, and private and charitable community
groups, including religious ones, should have the fullest opportunity permitted by law
to compete on a level playing field, so long as they achieve valid public purposes,
such as curbing crime, conquering addiction, strengthening families and neighborhoods, and overcoming poverty. This delivery of social services must be results oriented and should value the bedrock principles of pluralism, nondiscrimination, evenhandedness, and neutrality.
Exec. Order No. 13,199, 66 Fed. Reg. at 8499.
8. Id.; Exec. Order No. 13,280, 67 Fed. Reg. 77145, 77146 (Dec. 16, 2002)
(The agency shall "develop and coordinate agency outreach efforts to disseminate
information more effectively to faith-based and other community organizations with
respect to programming changes, contracting opportunities, and other agency initiatives, including but not limited to Web and Internet resources.").
9. Freedom from Religion Found., 433 F.3d at 993. "The conferences will be
supported by the Departments of Justice, Agriculture, Labor, Health and Human Services, Housing and Urban Development, Education, Commerce, and Veterans Affairs,
the Small Business Administration, and the Agency for International Development."
Id. See Exec. Order No. 13,280, 67 Fed. Reg. at 77146.
10. Freedomfrom Religion Found., 433 F.3d at 993.
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suit arose at the outset of a new round of 11conferences to support the FaithBased and Community Initiatives program.
One of the plaintiffs in the instant case, Freedom from Religion Foundation (FFRF), 12 attacked the constitutionality of using federal funds to host
these conferences. 13 FFRF alleged that "the conferences are designed to promote religious community organizations over secular ones" and characterized
the conferences as "propaganda vehicles for religion."' 14 The basis of their
lawsuit was that the conferences violated the
15 separation between church and
state governed by the Establishment Clause.
FFRF's standing to bring its challenge was as a federal taxpayer, alleging that the conferences are funded by money which has been appropriated by
Congress. 16 However, Congress did not earmark the money specifically for
the conferences or for any other activities of the various Faith-Based and
Community Initiatives programs. 17 Instead, the money was drawn from funds
allocated to the executive for general expenditures. 18 These are funds "over
which the President and other executive branch officials have a degree of
discretionary power."' 19 Plaintiffs claimed that executive expenditures in this
matter violate the Establishment Clause.
The district court granted the government's motion to dismiss on the
grounds that FFRF did not have taxpayer standing to challenge the Faith
Based and Community Initiatives conferences because federal funds had not
been appropriated directly by Congress to serve a religious goal.20 On appeal,
11. Id.
12. Freedom from Religion Foundation is an educational group whose self-stated
mission is "to promote the constitutional principle of separation of state and church,
and to educate
the public on matters relating to nontheism."
http://www.ffrf.org/purposes (last visited Mar. 4, 2006).
.13. Freedomfrom Religion Found., 433 F.3d at 993.
14. Id. at 433 F.3d at 993-94. Although the instant appeal is concerned with
whether FFRF has standing to challenge the executive expenditure of funds to host
conferences that are in part about the procedures required to get federal funds, they
also challenged the constitutionality of granting federal funds to a religious organization under the program. Id. at 996. The district court held that the plaintiffs do not
have standing to bring that challenge. Id. at 990.
15. Id. at 994. The majority characterizes the Establishment Clause as requiring
"that the government be neutral between religion and irreligion." Id. This characterization, however, is not consistent with Supreme Court precedent, which recognized
exemptions for religious organizations that did not exist for secular groups. See, e.g.,
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963) (holding that South Carolina must provide an exemption from its eligibility requirements for public welfare that allow an
individual to decline work on her Sabbath).
16. Freedomfrom Religion Found., 433 F.3d at 990.
17. Id. at 994.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 996.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2006
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the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision,
holding that "[tiaxpayers have standing to challenge an executive-branch
program, alleged to promote religion, that is financed by a congressional appropriation, even if the program was created
entirely within the executive
21
branch, as by Presidential executive order."
ff1. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Evolution of Taxpayer Standing

Article I of the Constitution defines the judicial power of the United
States, but it also limits the exercise of that power in several respects.22 One
of these limitations involves restricting the bounds of judicial power to
"Cases or Controversies. '' 3 Originally, this limitation was simply a reflection
of the familiar operations of the English judicial system and "its manifestations on this side of the ocean." 24 It was not within the jurisdiction of the

courts to exercise power over "abstract, intellectual problems," but to arbitrate "concrete, living contest[s] between adversaries." 25 Over time, the Court
adopted the doctrine of standing to protect the values inherent in this constitutional limitation. 26 This Note explores one facet of the standing doctrine, taxpayer standing, in an effort to understand the affect that
doctrine has on the
resolving alleged violations of the Establishment Clause.2 7

21. Id. at 996-97.
22. See U.S. CONST. art. Ill.

23. Id. § 2, cl. 1.
24. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 460 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). "Judicial power could come into play only in matters that were the traditional
concern of the courts at Westminster and only if they arose in ways that to the expert
feel of lawyers constituted 'Cases' or 'Controversies."' Id. Although the judges of
Westminster had the power to give advisory opinions, the federal bar on such opinions is grounded in the unique nature of American courts and the other two branches
of government. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, § 3529.1.
25. Freedomfrom Religion Found., 433 F.3d at 990.
26. See, e.g., WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, § 3529.
27. Although not the only inquiry into which attention should be drawn when
evaluating plaintiff standing, this Note is primarily concerned with the requirement
that a plaintiff show actual injury. See generally WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, § 3529
("Extended attention will be paid to the elements of injury, causation, and redressability that now shape Article III requirements.").
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28
Frothinghamv. Mellon

Beginning with Frothingham v. Mellon, 29 the Court exhibited disfavor
with the idea that the federal courts should be open to persons suffering

merely from grievances shared by the general public. In Frothingham,one of
the preeminent justiciability decisions, the Court held that a party requesting
the Court to exercise its power of judicial review "must be able to show, not
only that the statute is invalid, but that he has sustained or is immediately in
danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of its enforcement, and
not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people
generally. 30 The plaintiff in Frothingham had challenged a federal statute
that apportioned money to the states, conditioned upon state cooperation with
the federal government's efforts to reduce infant mortality rates.3' Plaintiff
complained that Congress exceeded its constitutionally enumerated powers in
enacting the program and claimed as an injury her tax burden in supporting
it. 32 In declining to approve taxpayer standing, the Court held that a plaintiffs
tax burden was not a sufficiently direct and immediate injury, and as a result,
the court was not justified in exercising its power of judicial review.33
Recently, the Court has continued to develop and affirm a bar to standing where a plaintiffs only injury is generalized and shared in an equal
measure among a large class of citizens. 34 Between Frothingham and the

28. 262 U.S. 447 (1923). Frothinghamwas the combination of two cases: Massachusetts v. Mellon and Frothingham v. Mellon. Id. It is most commonly cited as
Frothingham v. Mellon.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 488.
31. Id. at 480.
32. Id.
33. Id.at 488-89. "We have no power per se to review and annul acts of Congress on the ground that they are unconstitutional. That question may be considered
only when the justification for some direct injury suffered or threatened, presenting a
justiciable issue, is made to rest upon such an act." Id. at 488. "[T]he Court found a
lack of sufficiently direct injury to an immediate taxpayer interest to justify judicial
interference with legislative and executive powers, and suggested that allowing such
suits would generate grave 'inconveniences."' WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, § 3531.1.
34. See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 167-69 (1974) (denying
taxpayer standing to plaintiff seeking disclosure of C.I.A. expenditures under the
Accounts Clause of the Constitution, which requires a regular statement and account
of public funds); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 209
(1974) (denying taxpayer standing to plaintiff challenging constitutionality of members of Congress also holding commissions in the Armed Forces); Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490, 493 (1975) (denying plaintiffs standing to challenge allegedly discriminatory zoning ordinances).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2006
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contemporary affirmation
of Frothingham, however, there appears an anom35
aly: Flastv. Cohen.
36

Flastv. Cohen

In 1968, the Court granted a plaintiff standing as an individual federal
taxpayer. Flast involved an Establishment Clause challenge to federal funding of religious schools.37 According to the Court, the Case and Controversy
Clause articulated a dual limitation on judicial power. 38 First, it limits the
jurisdiction of federal courts to "questions presented in an adversary context
and in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial
process. 39 Second, and consistent with Frothingham,it defines the judiciary
as but one of a tripartite division of government "to assure that the federal
courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government. 4 0 The Court, however, recognized that standing rested not only upon
constitutional limitations, but upon prudential considerations as well.41 Ultimately, however, Flast failed to define exactly where the line was drawn
between Article IH limitations and prudential limitations.42
Standing is a question of whether the plaintiff is the appropriate party to
request adjudication of a particular issue, not of whether the issue itself is
43
justiciable. For example, the constitutional values protected by standing are
different than the values protected when a court declines to hear a political
question. 44 Standing implicates the adversarial prong of the Case or Controversy Clause as opposed to the separation of powers prong implicated by a
35. 392 U.S. 83 (1968). The Court in Flast recognized that in the twenty-six
years since Frothingham, the extent to which Frothingham was justified on policy
grounds was criticized. Id. at 94. The modem world saw corporate taxpayers contributing millions of dollars in federal tax liability, a far greater monetary liability than
they incurred in any municipality. Id. Fears that taxpayer suits would overwhelm the
federal system were at least partially obviated by modem rules regarding class action
and joinder. Id. These criticisms compelled the Court to take a fresh examination of
the limitations to sue in federal court. Id.
36. Flast, 392 U.S. 83.
37. Id. at 85-86.
38. Id. at 94-95.
39. Id. at 95.
40. Id. For example, both aspects of the dual role are evidenced in the longstanding rule that federal courts do not issue advisory opinions. Id. The rule implements the
separation of powers prescribed by the clause in confining the courts to the role assigned to them in Article ll. Id.at 96. It also encourages the court to hear only cases
brought within the adversarial context, where clear and concrete questions are more
likely to emerge. Id.at 96-97.
41. Id. at 97.
42. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
43. Flast, 392 U.S. at 99-100.
44. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol71/iss4/17
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political question.45 With the doctrine of standing, it is appropriate to question
whether the plaintiff has a personal stake in the outcome of the suit because a
personal stake advances adversarial tendencies.4 6 The Court suggested that, in
some cases, a taxpayer may have the requisite personal stake to challenge the
suit and in other cases the taxpayer may not; therefore, the47 Case or Controversy Clause must not provide an absolute bar to such suits.
Although standing is a question of whether the proper party has brought
the suit, the substantive issue being litigated is relevant for another purpose:
"whether there is a logical nexus between the status asserted [by the plaintiff]
and the claim sought to be adjudicated." 48 This inquiry is essential in determining if the plaintiff is the proper party to prosecute a particular claim.49
When standing is pled as a federal taxpayer, the "action turns on whether [the
plaintiff] can demonstrate the necessary stake as [a] taxpayer[] in the outcome
of the litigation to satisfy Article III requirements." 50 Thus, under Flast, a
taxpayer only has the necessary stake in the controversy if he is challenging
an exercise of congressional power under the Taxing and Spending Clause
because it is the Taxing and Spending Clause that forms the
necessary nexus
51
between taxpayer-as-plaintiff and injury to the tax burden.
But the inquiry does not stop there. A taxpayer challenge must also involve more than merely incidental expenditures of tax funds in furtherance of
52
a regulatory statute. Further, the plaintiff must "show that the challenged
enactment exceeds specific constitutional limitations imposed upon the exercise of the congressional taxing and spending power and not simply that the
enactment is generally beyond the powers delegated to Congress by Art[icle]
I, [Section] 8. 3 The Flast court held that the Establishment Clause was a
specific limitation on congressional power to tax and spend.54 In fact, the
Court noted that the Establishment Clause was specifically designed to pre45. Id. at 100-01. The Court would later change its mind on this issue, and rule
that standing also implicates the separation of powers prong. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472
(1982).
46. Flast,392 U.S. at 101.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 102.
49. Id. The nexus requirement is what distinguishes Flast from Frothingham,
because it alters the inquiry from whether the case involves merely taxpayer standing
to whether the nexus between taxpayer status and the claim being adjudicated is sufficient to meet the adversarial requirements of Article 1I. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2,
§ 3531.1.
50. Flast,392 U.S. at 102.
51. Id.
52. Id. This requirement, that the expense not be incidental, "is consistent with
the limitation imposed upon state-taxpayer standing in federal courts." Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 104.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2006
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vent government financial aid in support of one religion over another. 55 It was
this later requirement which failed the plaintiffs in Frothingham,because the
challenge to the Maternity Act was as an invasion of "the legislative province
reserved to the several States
by the Tenth Amendment," not to Congress's
56
taxing and spending power.
Valley Forge ChristianCollege v. Americans United
for a Separation
57
Inc.
State,
and
Church
of
The Court reinforced and clarified Flast doctrine in Valley Forge Chris58
tian College v. Americans Unitedfor a Separationof Church and State, Inc.
The Court declared that Article Il stands to protect "the autonomy of those
persons likely to be most directly affected by a judicial order." 9 Further,
Article III prevents the federal courts from becoming "'no more than a vehicle for the vindication of the value interests of concerned bystanders.' 60 In
this respect, the injury-in-fact requirement promotes the values present in an
adversarial
setting where the plaintiff has a direct stake in the outcome of the
61
action.
In Valley Forge, the Court exposed the line between the threshold Article I standing requirements and the Court's self-imposed prudential limitations. 62 Article llI requires a plaintiff who can show actual or threatened in63
jury. The Court's prudential doctrine, however, further denies standing to
adjudicate "'abstract questions of wide public significance' which amount to
'generalized grievances,' pervasively shared and most appropriately ad64
dressed in the representative branches."
The plaintiffs in Valley Forge were denied standing because they failed
the Flast test in both respects. They alleged that a transfer of surplus property
to a religious organization was a violation of the Establishment Clause.
55. Id. at 103-04.
56. Id. at 91.
57. 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
58. Id. at 479-80.
59. Id. at 473.
60. Id. (quoting United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973)).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 474-75. Both Article III and the prudential requirements are rooted in
the same justifications, but the prudential requirements are especially concerned with
the Court's self-governance in maintaining the limited role of the federal judiciary in
solving public disputes. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975).
63. Valley Forge Christian College, 454 U.S. at 472.
64. Id. at 475 (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 499). In classifying generalized
grievances as a prudential limitation, the Court acknowledged that such an injury
meets the Constitutional requirements. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, §
3531.2.
65. Valley Forge ChristianCollege, 454 U.S. at 469.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol71/iss4/17
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However, in pleading taxpayer standing under Flast, the plaintiffs were required to allege a violation of the Taxing and Spending Clause. The property
at issue in Valley Forge was given away through a congressional exercise
under the Property Clause. 66 Although the property was purchased with a
congressional expenditure thirty years prior, the plaintiffs did not challenge
that expenditure. 67 Thus, the Court held that the taxpayers in Valley Forge did
to challenge the grant of surplus property to a religious
not have standing
organization. 68
Bowen v. Kendrick69
In 1988 with its decision in Bowen v. Kendrick the Court further expanded the Flast doctrine. 70 Bowen involved a challenge to a federal grant
program providing funding for services related to adolescent sexuality and
pregnancy. 7 1 Although the money was appropriated by Congress directly to
the program under its taxing and spending power,72 the Secretary of Health
and determined some of the
and Human Services administered the grants
73
services required to meet grant eligibility.
It was clear that plaintiffs had the right to challenge the program on its
face, 74 but it was unclear whether the plaintiffs could challenge the program
as applied by the Secretary.7 5 The Court held that administration by the executive department did not destroy the nexus between taxpayer and the congressional exercise of its taxing and spending power.7 6 Thus, the plaintiffs
had standing to challenge the actions of the Secretary in executing the program. This case set the stage for the Seventh Circuit's decision in Freedom
from Religion Foundationv. Chao, but it did not clearly answer the question
presented in that case: whether a program created by the Executive, not Congress, and funded only through discretionary funds, not specific congressional
grants to the program, could be brought into federal court through the taxpayer standing doctrine.
66. Id. at 480. The Property Clause can be found in Article IV, Section 3, Clause
2 of the Constitution.
67. Id. at 480 n.17.
68. Id. at 480.
69. 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 593.
72. Id. at 619.
73. Id. at 594 ("[T]he AFLA leaves it up to the Secretary of Health and Human
Services (the Secretary) to define exactly what types of services a grantee must provide.").
74. Id. at 618. The constitutional allegation was that the Secretary was distributing financial support in violation of the Establishment Clause. Id.
75. Id. at 618.
76. Id. at 620.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2006
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B. Structural Violations of the Constitution and Injury-in-Fact
Requiring a plaintiff to have direct injury serves the values that standing
protects. Injured plaintiffs promote the adversarial system because injury
"assure[s] that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. 77 Further, actual injury keeps the court within the bounds of
its role as a co-equal branch of the federal government by restricting its constitutional inquires to only those cases with plaintiffs who 79
suffer harm. 8
plaintiffs.
proper
These values restrict the issues litigated to the
The search for the proper plaintiff can be vexing when the constitutional
challenge is to a structural limit on the exercise of government power. 8° Violations of structural limits may not always result in the type of concrete injury
that the Court expects under its standing doctrine. 81 For example, it is difficult
to imagine a plaintiff with an individualized injury when the act being challenged is whether members of Congress may simultaneously hold office and
be members of the military reserves, in contravention of the Incompatibility
Clause of the Constitution. 82 Similarly, without Flast taxpayer standing, violations of the Establishment Clause may go without redress because some
violations will not create a plaintiff with individual injury. The Court has
refused to grant standing, though, merely because a structural restraint may
never create a plaintiff with individualized
injury because a generalized
83
grievance is insufficient to confer standing.

77. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). See also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S.
83, 96-97 (1968).
78. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 353 n.3 (1996). In Lewis, the Court clarified that standing protects not only the values of an adversarial system, but also promotes a separation-of-powers between the court and the other branches of the federal
government. Id.
79. Flast, 392 U.S. at 99-100 ("In other words, when standing is placed in issue
in a case, the question is whether the person whose standing is challenged is a proper
party to request an adjudication of a particular issue and not whether the issue itself is
justiciable.").
80. Esbeck, supra note 4, at 34.
A violation of a right will result in an individualized injury and thereby
produce a claimant with standing to sue. The exceeding of a structural
limit, however, will not necessarily result in an individualized injury.
Hence, where overstepping a structural restraint is involved, there may not
be an individual claimant with standing to sue.
Id. See also ERwIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND PoLIcIEs
§ 2.5, 95-96 (2d ed. 2002).
81. Esbeck, supra note 4, at 34. CHEMERiNSKY, supra note 80, § 2.5 at 96.
82. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 22021 (1974) (The Court denied standing.).
83. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974)
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol71/iss4/17
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In United States v. Richardson, the structural restraint at issue was the
Accounts Clause.84 The plaintiff challenged "provisions of the Central Intelligence Agency Act which provide that appropriations to and expenditures by
that Agency shall not be made public. ' '85 In Schlesinger v. Reservists Commit-

tee to Stop the War, plaintiffs sought to have all members of Congress discharged from the military reserves, arguing that holding both offices violated
the Incompatibility Clause. 6 These cases recognize the fear that the federal
87
judiciary might be used to inhibit the political process. Without more, a
citizen does not have a right to use the federal courts 88to ensure a government
that follows all the structural rules of the Constitution.
But to understand why the federal courts should divorce themselves
from these questions, it is important to recognize the purpose of the constitu(It may be argued that if respondent is not permitted to litigate this issue,
no one can do so. In a very real sense, the absence of any particular individual or class to litigate these claims gives support to the argument that
the subject matter is committed to the surveillance of Congress, and ultimately to the political process.).
84. The Accounts Clause states that "[n]o Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and
Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published
from time to time." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.

85. Richardson,418 U.S at, 168 n. 1 (1974).
86. 418 U.S. 208, 211 (1982). They also sought repayment of reserve income
paid to former members of Congress who served both offices simultaneously. Id. The
Incompatibility Clause states that
[n]o Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was
elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United
States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall
have been encreased during such time; and no Person holding any Office
under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.
U.S. CONST. art I, § 6, cl. 2.
87. James Leonard & Joanne C. Brant, The Half-Open Door: Article III, The
Injury-in-FactRule and the Framers' Planfor Federal Courts of Limited Jurisdiction, 54 RUTGERS L. REv. 1, 22 (2001).
88. See, e.g., Richardson, 418 U.S. at 179.
The Constitution created a representative Government with the representatives directly responsible to their constituents at stated periods of two, four,
and six years; that the Constitution does not afford a judicial remedy does
not, of course, completely disable the citizen who is not satisfied with the
'ground rules' established by the Congress for reporting expenditures of
the Executive Branch. Lack of standing within the narrow confines of Art.
III jurisdiction does not impair the right to assert his views in the political
forum or at the polls.
Id. See also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 80, § 2.5, at 96. "The effect of the generalized
grievance doctrine is to read these clauses out of the Constitution except to the extent
the political branches want to voluntarily comply with them." Id.
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tional restraints at issue in these cases. The Incompatibility Clause, at issue in
Schlesinger, separates the legislative branch from the other two branches by
prohibiting a national legislator from holding any other office in the federal
government, thus ensuring the disbursement of government power and maintaining the system of checks and balances.8 9 Furthermore, the Accounts
Clause, at issue in Richardson, ensures that disbursement of appropriations
have been accounted to the public, thus providing a check on Congress's
spending power by ensuring the political process is well-informed. 9° Because
these clauses restrict the bounds of power between branches or influence the
political process, the federal courts should intervene and interpret the lines of
separation only when a plaintiff comes forward with individualized injury
because doing so implicates the limited role of the federal judiciary, and the
absence of such a plaintiff demonstrates that the subject matter has been
committed to the political process. 91 In other words, if the public does not like
the actions that gave rise to the complaints in Richardson or Schlesinger, they
have recourse: change the political body that made those decisions through
the democratic process. Requiring injury-in-fact and traditional notions of
standing, therefore, promotes both the limited role of the federal court system
and the underlying political process of our system of government. It also
demonstrates the necessity of inquiring into the harms against which these
structural restraints were designed to prevent.
C. The Dual Harms ProtectedAgainst by the EstablishmentClause
The Establishment Clause protects two actors from harm by the government. It protects religion, 92 and it also protects the body politic from the
division caused by active government involvement in religious belief.93 Identifying the potential harm of a constitutional violation is critical, because the
harm identifies the type of injury that might focalize a complaint into a justiciable question. Like other structural violations, a violation of the Establish94
ment Clause may not always create a plaintiff with individualized injury.

89. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
90. Id. § 9, cl. 7; see Leonard & Brant, supra note 87, at 128-29.
91. Richardson,418 U.S. at 179; see Leonard & Brant, supra note 87, at 128-29.
92. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 620 (1971) ("This kind of state
inspection and evaluation of the religious content of a religious organization is fraught
with the sort of entanglement that the Constitution forbids. It is a relationship pregnant with dangers of excessive government direction of church schools and hence of
churches."); Esbeck, supra note 4, at 73.
93. See e.g., Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622-23 (1971).
94. See Esbeck, supra note 4, at 5-6. The instant case may pose such an example.
See Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Chao, 433 F.3d 989, 993 (7th Cir. 2006).
If the government is hosting the conferences promoting the "Faith-Based and Community Initiatives" program without singling out one religion over another, then it is
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol71/iss4/17
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Therefore, it is necessary to understand the harms protected against by the
Establishment Clause to understand why it should be treated differently than
other structural clauses.
First, the Establishment Clause protects religious organizations from
governmental interference. 95 Throughout history, government has made
monetary grants to private organizations, but such grants are "almost always.
•*.accompanied by varying measures of control and surveillance." 96 In striking down government financial aid to religious schools, the Supreme Court
stated that
[t]he government cash grants before us now provide no basis for
predicting that comprehensive measures of surveillance and controls
will not follow. In particular the government's post-audit power to
inspect and evaluate a church-related school's financial records and
to determine which expenditures are religious and which are secular
creates7 an intimate and continuing relationship between church and
state.

9

The danger, therefore, in allowing religions to accept cash subsidies granted
by the government is not in the benefit it poses to the religion, but the risk
that government will inject itself into the functioning and belief of religious
organizations through the control it attaches to the money.
Second, the Establishment Clause protects the body politic from the division that naturally occurs when government aids religion. By nature, government action made absent unanimity fragments and divides the body politic. 98 Ordinarily, this is a healthy exercise of our democratic system because it
encourages vigorous debate on important issues that face the country. 99 When
government aids religion, however, the division forms along religious lines,
which is "one of the principal evils against which the First Amendment was
intended to protect." This division threatens the normal political process.'°°
In striking down government financial support of nonpublic (chiefly religious) elementary and secondary schools, Chief Justice Burger had this to
say: "It conflicts with our whole history and tradition to permit questions of
the Religion Clauses to assume such importance in our legislatures and in our
elections that they could divert attention from the myriad issues and problems
that confront every level of government." ° With this understanding, it might
be said that the Establishment Clause particularly withdraws religious debate
from the government sphere and vests that debate instead in the people, who
difficult to imagine an organization or individual that will incur injury-in-fact. Instead, the harm is generalized and shared by the body politic.
95. See, e.g., Lemon, 403 U.S. at 620 (1971).
96. Id. at 621-22; see also Esbeck, supra note 4, at 73-74.
97. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 621-22.
98. Id. at 622.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 623.
101. Id.
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maintain and enjoy an individual and a structurally guaranteed right to religious liberty. 10 2 Questions of religion are meant to be sorted out by individuals and private-sector groups, not by government. 10 3 This assures the body
their shared social ills without being
politic of a government free to 1solve
04
divided over contests of religion.

V. THE INSTANT DECISION
10 5

A. Majority Opinion

Judge Posner, joined by Judge Wood, reversed the holding of the district
court and held that the plaintiffs had standing as federal taxpayers to challenge the constitutionality of executive branch expenditures funding the conferences. 10 6 Expanding the doctrine of taxpayer standing to challenge Establishment Clause violations set forth in Flast, the court refused to recognize
the distinction between a federal program created and specifically funded by
Congress (as was the program in Flast)and a program created entirely within
the executive branch funded through general appropriations (as are the conferences in FFRF). 107 The court's opinion, as explained more fully below, is
similarity of specific and general congressional
grounded in the practical
08
appropriations of funds.'
The majority began by summarizing both traditional and modem notions
of standing. In recognizing that traditional notions of standing require a plaintiff to show injury-in-fact, the court ruled that the plaintiffs, in this case, did
not suffer any such injury. 1 9 Thus, "it [was] taxpayer standing or nothing for

102. This is the function of the Free Exercise Clause and demonstrates why these
two clauses are independent entities, preventing very different harms.
103. Id.
104. This does not mean, however, that churches and religious organizations lack
the same fundamental right to participate in the political process as secular individuals. Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York 397 U.S. 664,670 (1970)
(Adherents of particular faiths and individual churches frequently take
strong positions on public issues including, as this case reveals in the several briefs amici, vigorous advocacy of legal or constitutional positions. Of
course, churches as much as secular bodies and private citizens have that
right. No perfect or absolute separation is really possible; the very existence of the Religion Clauses is an involvement of sorts--one that seeks to
mark boundaries to avoid excessive entanglement.).
105. The Honorable Richard Posner, joined by the Honorable Harlington Wood
Jr., wrote for the majority. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Chao, 443 F.3d
989, 990.
106. Id. at 996-97.
107. Id..
108. Id. at 994.
109. Id. at 991.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol71/iss4/17
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plaintiffs."" 0 After asserting that the notion of general taxpayer standing
was long ago discarded by the Supreme Court,"'1 the majority noted that
Flast had created an exception when a plaintiff challenged a congressional
expenditure that allegedly violated the Establishment Clause.112 The question
the court faced was not whether to follow Flast, but whether Flast extended
beyond congressional expenditures specifically earmarked for the challenged
program or activity. 3
To demonstrate the fallacy of allowing taxpayer standing to turn on
whether the congressional expenditure was a specific or a general appropriation, the court postulated a hypothetical.1 4 Suppose the Secretary of Homeland Security used general appropriations in her budget "to build a mosque
and pay an Imam a salary to preach in it because the Secretary believed that
federal financial assistance to Islam would reduce the likelihood of Islamist
terrorism" in the country. 1 5 Judge Posner suggested that such an "elaborate
[and] public.. . subvention of religion would give rise to standing to sue on
other grounds." ' 1 6 Therefore, "it would be too much of a paradox to recognize
taxpayer standing only in cases in which the violation of the establishment
clause was so slight or furtive that no other
basis of standing could be found,
' 7
and to deny it in the more serious cases." "
However, the court recognized a limiting principle in the Establishment
Clause's standing doctrine, stating that "the fact that almost all executive
branch activity is funded by appropriations does not [alone] confer standing
to challenge" government financial support. 1 18 To contrast its earlier hypo...

110. Id.
111. Id. at 990. The court noted the rejection of taxpayer standing was grounded
in the fact that the tangible harm to a taxpayer would often be "zero because if the
complained-of expenditure was enjoined, the money would probably be used to defray some other public expense that would not benefit the taxpayer, rather than returned to [the taxpayer] in the form of a lower tax rate." Id.
112. Id. at 991. The court acknowledged the dichotomy it created by denying to
adopt a principle of general taxpayer standing, but adopting Flast taxpayer standing
when violation is to the Establishment Clause. It resolved this incongruity by distinguishing between Article III standing and prudential standing. See id. Prudential
standing principles are
judge-made principles... that deny standing to someone who has been injured as a result of the defendant's conduct (the core standing requirement
of Article III) but who is not the 'right' person to bring suit, maybe because
someone has been injured more seriously and should be allowed to control
the litigation.
Id.
113. Id. at 990.
114. Id. at 994.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 994-95.
118. Id. at 995.
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thetical, the court postulated another: "Imagine a suit complaining that the
President was violating the [Establishment] clause by including favorable
references to religion in his State of the Union Address."' 19 Taxpayers do not
enjoy standing to bring a complaint in such a hypothetical case, because the
President did not expend funds for a religious purpose. 12 Although an accountant could estimate the consequential costs to taxpayers of the President's address, the cost would not be greater
' 21 because the President "mentioned Moses rather than John Stuart Mill.'
Conversely, in the mosque hypothetical and in the instant case, money
was undoubtedly appropriated to the objectionable program, "albeit by executive officials from discretionary funds handed them by Congress, rather than
by Congress directly."12 2 Thus, the court determined that the distinction upon
which standing turns is not which branch of the government directs where the
congressional appropriations are spent, but
whether that money has been ap23
propriated to an objectionable program. 1
The government asked the court to draw the line not between speech and
initiative, but between the initiative and actual grants to religious organizations.' 24 The government's line would give taxpayers standing to challenge
federal grants of money to religious organizations, but not to challenge federal expenditures to support conferences that in part train religious organizations in how to obtain grants.' 25 The court thought that this line "would be
artificial because there is so much that executive officials could do to promote
religion in ways forbidden by the establishment clause."' 126 For example, as
long as it never made
a grant of money to a contractor, the government could
27
operate a mosque.1
Next, the court took up an exception, carved out in Flast,which denies
standing when the alleged violation is "an incidental expenditure of tax funds
in the administration of an essentially regulatory statute."' 128 The court declined to define the word "incidental" by comparing the cost of the confer29
ences to the budget of the various executive departments hosting them.
Such a comparison would deny taxpayers standing in any case, because any
single expenditure would appear "incidental" against "the great goal of the
public welfare, a pursuit that costs the federal government some $2 trillion a

119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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year." 130 Instead, the court reserved the word "incidental" "for such cases as
that of the government's expenditure on an armored limousine to transport
the President to the Capitol to deliver
the State of the Union address in which
' 31
he speaks favorably of religion."'
Lastly, the court reviewed a line of cases wherein taxpayer standing to
enforce provisions other than the Establishment Clause was rejected. 3 2 That
line of cases supported the proposition that "[w]hen what is involved is expenditures in implementation of a regulatory statute, or mere executive activity that entails some expenditures, there is no ...arrow aimed at taxpayers as
a class."' 33 Consistent with this line of cases, the court determined that taxpayers could not challenge programs of unquestioned constitutionality simply
because federal employees sometimes deviated from constitutional activities. 134 Returning to its hypothetical State of the Union address, the court
stated that even in the "unlikely event that the speech violated the establishment clause," an offended citizen would not have standing to sue
because the
35
constitutionality of the State of the Union was not questioned. 1
Accordingly, while taxpayers are not granted standing to sue for lapses
in administering otherwise constitutional programs, FFRF alleged something
altogether different. 136 Its challenge, in the instant case, was to the constitutionality of the conferences supporting the Faith-Based and Community Initiatives program itself. 137 Therefore, "the fact that it was funded out of general rather than earmarked appropriations-that it was an executive rather than
a congressional program-does not deprive taxpayers of standing to challenge
it.,,138

B. Dissenting Opinion

In his dissent, Judge Ripple refused to expand the Flast's doctrine to
programs created wholly in the executive and funded only through general
appropriations.' 39 Further, he argued that the plaintiffs did not allege an injury
sufficient to overcome
the threshold requirements of constitutional standing
140
under Article In.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 995-96. Returning to its mosque hypothetical, the court described the
budget for the Department of Homeland Security as $30 billion, compared to which
the cost of a mosque would "certainly be incidental." Id. at 995.
132. Id. at 996.
133. Id. (omission in original).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1000 (Ripple, J., dissenting).
140. Id.
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Although Flast carved out the taxpayer standing exception for alleged
violations of the Establishment Clause, it did not eliminate the constitutional
As Judge Ripple noted, a concrete injury remains an "irrerequirement.
ducible constitutional minimum" to taxpayer standing. 142 Part of the formula
set forth in Flast for analyzing constitutional injury is "whether the plaintiffs
have, in the allegations of their complaint, set forth with sufficient rigor a
exercise of the congressional
nexus between their status as taxpayers and an143
power under the Taxing and Spending Clause."'

The plaintiffs argued that the expenditure of government funds in support of the Faith-Based and Community Initiatives conferences, allegedly in
violation of the Establishment Clause, was sufficient to show the required
nexus. The government replied that, because the funds were expended by the
President in his discretion, not through a specific appropriation by Congress,
the "object of the plaintiffs' complaint" was not the Taxing and Spending
Clause, but the President's use of the funds. 144
For the foregoing reasons, Judge Ripple agreed with the government. In
Judge Ripple's view, the majority's approach, "while possessing an initial
appeal, simply cuts the concept of taxpayer standing loose from its moorings."' 145 Judge Ripple would have restrained Flast to its narrow facts, 146 and
he would read Valley Forge to foreclose standing to plaintiffs in cases where
the challenged program originated in the executive department.147 Further, he
argued that Bowen v. Kendrick did not alter this general proposition, because
Bowen involved a program that "Congress had created."' 148 In Judge Ripple's
opinion made "virtually
estimation, the expansion adopted by the majority
149
any executive action subject to taxpayer suit.,
V. COMMENT

This comment argues that, while the Flast doctrine serves an important
function in protecting the values of the Establishment Clause, it is critical to
understand that the Flastdoctrine is simply a legal fiction that endures merely
to advance those values. Because those values are unique in the federal constitution in that they organize relations between church and state, not
branches of the federal government, a more logical approach would be to
adopt a rule of citizen standing for challenges under the Establishment
141. Id.

142. Id. at 997.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 998.

145. Id.
146. Id. at 1000.
147. Id.
148. Id. (emphasis omitted).
149. Id.
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Clause. This approach would be consistent with the dual harms the Establishment Clause was designed to protect against: a political debate free of
religious strife and religious freedom unencumbered by political influence.
Unfortunately, the Court has rejected the notion of citizen standing. 50 Alternatively, it, therefore, makes sense to allow Flast's expansion at least as far,
if not farther, than the facts of the instant case because doing so does not expose Flast as the legal fiction for which it is. In other words, the expansion of
the doctrine sought by FFRF is slight enough that it does not drastically alter
the doctrine. This comment steps through each of these arguments to prove
that this is a proper and logical result advancing constitutional values.
A. Standing is an Inquiry into Whether the ProperPlaintiffhas
Brought Suit
The court veered off-target, in a formalistic sense, when it based its
holding on the pragmatic incongruity that might result if it allowed adjudication of serious Establishment Clause violations, but denied adjudication of
slight or furtive ones. 151 The court's holding was that a taxpayer has standing
to challenge the executive department's use of discretionary money to fund
programs that allegedly violate the Establishment Clause, just as Flastallows
challenges to funding of allegedly unconstitutional programs by specific con152
gressional appropriation (funding of a program created by Congress).
The
153
controlling.
be
not
should
distinction
a
such
that
court believed
In justification, the court posed the hypothetical stated in Section IV
wherein the Department of Homeland Security funded a mosque to reduce the
likelihood of Islamist terrorism in the United States. 154 The court reasoned
that "it would be too much of a paradox to recognize taxpayer standing only
in cases in which the violation of the Establishment Clause was so slight or
furtive that no other basis of standing could be found, and to deny it in the
more serious cases."' 155 Without more, this rationale goes against Flast's direct mandate that standing is not an inquiry into whether the merits of a claim
should be reached, but an inquiry into whether the plaintiff is the appropriate

150. Admitedly, citizen standing, even if adopted merely for structural violations
under the Establishment Clause, might be a costly rule. It would require that the court
open its doors to every citizen with a religious grievance.
151. Id. at 994-95 (majority opinion).
152. Id. at 996-97.
153. Id. at 994.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 994-95. For an example of how plaintiffs might find standing in the
"more serious" case, see ACLU of Illinois v. City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265,
269 (7th Cir. 1986) (finding that plaintiff has standing to challenge government display of Latin cross during Christmas because she had to detour her custom route to
avoid seeing the cross).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2006

19

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 71, Iss. 4 [2006], Art. 17
1218

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

person to bring the claim. 156 However, whether the court focused on the
wrong inquiry does not answer the question presented in the instant case,
which is whether Flast allows standing to challenge executive department
discretionary funding of programs allegedly violating the Establishment
Clause. To answer that question, we must first unpack the injury that Flast
proposes protection against.
B. The Flast Fiction

Flast posits that taxpayers have a direct injury in unconstitutional expenditures of their tax debt. However, taxpayer standing, as described and
allowed by Flast,is a legal fiction. 57 The injury asserted by a taxpayer is that
she is being compelled to pay to the government a tax in support of a constitutionally deficient program. But, if the injury the Court is being asked to
redress is a tax, the appropriate remedy to that injury would be a refund of the
tax or a reduction in the complainant's tax burden. 158 The plaintiffs did not
seek such a remedy in Flast, Bowen, or in Freedom from Religion Foundation. Instead, plaintiffs sought an injunction to prevent the disbursement of
federal funds to the allegedly unconstitutional programs. 159 The remedy,

156. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968) ("The fundamental aspect of
standing is that it focuses on the party seeking to get his complaint before a federal
court and not on the issues he wishes to have adjudicated.").
157. See Esbeck, supra note 4, at 36 n.138; Louis Henkin, Foreword: On Drawing Lines, 82 HARV. L. REv. 63, 74 (1968) ("And it is a fiction that a taxpayer like
Flast is asserting a personal stake or interest based on his reluctance to have his tax
money expended for the purpose to which he objects.").
158. In a contemporary case decided by the Seventh Circuit, also written by Judge
Posner, the court draws this distinction to light. See Laskowski v. Spellings, 443 F.3d
930 (7th Cir. 2006). Laskowski involved disbursements made to support a charitable
program of religious character at Notre Dame. Id. at 933. Plaintiffs could not seek an
injunction against the program, however, because the money had already been disbursed. Id. at 933-34. Defendants argued that this mooted the case. Id. The court,
applying its holding in Freedom from Religion Foundation,held to the contrary be-

cause plaintiffs stood before the court as taxpayers, and the injury suffered was to
their tax burden. Id. Therefore, if successful on the merits, Notre Dame could be required to refund the ill-begotten tax monies it received to the United States treasury.
Id. at 938-39. This result demonstrates that although a tax refund might be available,
it is rarely sought in Establishment Clause cases, because Flast is used as a legal fiction to protect against the harms the Establishment Clause was designed to prevent,
not the pecuniary harm suffered by a taxpayer in the unconstitutional expenditure of
tax money.
159. Flast v. Gardner, 271 F. Supp. 1, 1-2 (1967), rev'd sub nom., Flast v. Cohen,
392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968); Kendrick v. Bowen, 657 F. Supp. 1547, 1570 (D.D.C. 1987),
rev'd, 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
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therefore, does not match the harm giving the plaintiff standing to challenge
the program. 160
If Flast is not designed to protect taxpayers from the pecuniary harm
suffered when government expends money advancing religion, then what
harm is it designed to protect against? It protects against the dual harms prevented by the Establishment Clause. As discussed in Section III, the Establishment Clause protects against both harm to religion and the harm to the
161
body politic suffered by injecting religious matters into the political debate.
These harms are likely to go without redress in the absence of some exception
to the standing doctrine, because of the Establishment Clause's nature as a
structural restraint on power.
A violation of the nature found in the instant case harms, or threatens to
harm, the very organizations that receive the benefit of federal money. 62 By
entangling themselves with the government, they make themselves vulnerable
to government control. 163 So while the prospect of government aid may gleam
brightly in the organization's eye, the cloud of government control hangs
nearby. 164 Although this harm creates an injury specific and individual to the
religious institutions accepting the aid, and they may very well have standing
to sue, they are unlikely ever to bring suit because a successful suit would
mean the loss of the government funding the institution relies upon. Therefore, the harm is unlikely to be redressed, 165
and one of the chief purposes of the
Establishment Clause cannot be enforced.
160. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, § 3531.10 ("The injury redressed by the Flast
decision is not really the injury of tax payments. Instead, it is the sense of wrong that
arises from unconstitutional acts of government. Only a theory that some constitutional rights deserve greater judicial solicitude than others can account for the Flast
ruling that unconstitutional spending is an injury sufficient to confer standing with
respect to some constitutional trespasses but not others. The result is not taxpayer
standing, but simply Establishment Clause standing.")
161. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
162. See Esbeck, supra note 4, at 73; Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 620
(1971).
163. See Esbeck, supra note 4, at 73; Lemon, 403 U.S. at 620.
164. See, e.g., Lemon, 403 U.S. 621-22.
(The history of government grants of a continuing cash subsidy indicates that
such programs have almost always been accompanied by varying measures of
control and surveillance. The government cash grants before us now provide no
basis for predicting that comprehensive measures of surveillance and controls
will not follow. In particular the government's post-audit power to inspect and
evaluate a church-related school's financial records and to determine which
expenditures are religious and which are secular creates an intimate and continuing relationship between church and state.)
See also Esbeck, supra note 4, at 73-74.
165. When the Establishment Clause is understood as a structural restraint on state
power, it is not sufficient to waive away the harm to religious organizations as one
might surrender their objection to an individual right. See, e.g., Clinton v. City of
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Meanwhile, the other harm protected against by the Establishment
Clause may also go without redress, because it is unlikely to generate individual plaintiffs with injury-in-fact. The harm that results when the political
body is preoccupied debating religious matters by its nature is a harm shared
by all citizens. Therefore, it lacks the individualized nature required by the
Court's standing doctrine. Because the Establishment Clause is unique among
structural restraints in the Constitution, this debate is particularly well-suited
to the federal courts.
C. Taxpayer Standing Advances Redress of Harm to the Body Politic
As explained previously, the Court has rejected the idea that all citizens
have standing to challenge violations of structural restraints, even when those
restraints are unlikely to generate a plaintiff with injury-in-fact., 66 But the
specific nature of the Establishment Clause compels a different result. When
a violation of the Accounts Clause was implicated, the Court denied citizen
standing to a plaintiff who wanted to know where Congressional money was
being spent.167 Rather, a citizenry that disagreed with the level of disclosure
Congress was making with regard to public money has a remedy in the political process: elect a different Congress. Similarly, an alleged violation of the
Incompatibility Clause did not give rise to citizen standing. 16 The purpose of
that restraint was to order power between the branches of government and
prevent an individual from holding office in two branches simultaneously.
Again, the political process provides an adequate remedy and limits the federal court's role in drawing those lines of power. In these instances, requiring
a plaintiff with individualized injury ensures that the court is not refereeing
disputes among co-equal branches of the government.
The Establishment Clause, however, is an altogether different sort of
structural restraint. It does not separate branches of government. Rather, it
separates government from organized religion. One of its chief goals is to
protect the division that occurs from injecting religious debate into the body
politic. Therefore, the political process is not an adequate remedy to a generalized grievance, because placing these issues into the political debate implicates one of the very harms the Establishment Clause was designed to protect
against. As a result, the federal courts, insulated from political pressure, are
particularly suited to adjudicating the boundaries the Establishment Clause
New York, 524 U.S. 417, 452 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (standing for the
proposition that violations of structural clauses cannot be waived).
166. Valley Forge Christian Coll, v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 488, 102 (1982). Cf Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 115-116
(1968) (Fortas, J., concurring) ("Perhaps the vital interest of a citizen in the establishment issue, without reference to his taxpayer's status, would be acceptable as a
basis for this challenge.").
167. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 170 (1974).
168. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 209 (1974).
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draws between church and state. And citizen standing
seems an appropriate
69
means of putting those disputes in front of the court.'
Although citizen standing is the more sensible doctrine, plaintiffs are
left with a narrower version of the same in the Flast fiction. In recognizing
the Establishment Clause as a specific restraint on taxing and spending, Flast
carves out the exception that standing will be granted when a plaintiff incurs
a tax burden that allegedly aids religion in violation of the Establishment
Clause.170 This is consistent with the Founders' particular interest in preventing the establishment of a national religion through financial support by the
government. 171
When the fiction is understood, it should make no difference whether
federal funds are appropriated by Congress specifically or by the Executive
using discretionary funds. In Freedomfrom Religion Foundation, the plaintiffs alleged that the executive branch was unconstitutionally aiding religion
by hosting conferences to support the President's Faith-Based and Community Initiatives program.172 The harm to these plaintiffs is the harm of injecting religious debate into the political process. 173 Although a generalized injury, it is distinguishable from the types of generalized injuries the Court has
rejected because the Establishment Clause is specifically designed to separate
church and state and prevent government injection of religion into the political process.' 74 In recognizing the harm, Flast represents only a narrow right
to adjudicate such harms, specifically, the right to challenge acts that are exercises of the Taxing and Spending Clause. 175 Plaintiffs in the instant case
meet that nexus. Unlike Valley Forge, this is not an exercise of government
power under the Property Clause, but a use of tax money to, allegedly, aid
religion.

169. One argument against citizen standing is that such a relaxation of the standing doctrine threatens to overwhelm the federal court system and consume valuable
judicial resources. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, § 3531.3. But this argument is
hardly compelling if you accept the argument put forth in this Note that the Establishment Clause particularly vests the resolution of these debates in federal judiciary
in order to free the political process from the division that occurs as a result of these
debates.
170. Valley Forge ChristianColl., 454 U.S. at 478-79.
171. Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
172. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Chao, 433 F.3d 989, 994 (7th Cir.
2006).
173. See supra Part III.C.
174. The generalized injury to the body politic, religious divisiveness, is no less
specific than the tax injury that Flast allows to be sufficient to grant standing, because
any debate by the government is time, energy and money that could spent debating
issues that have not been withdrawn from the political process by the Establishment
Clause.
175. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968).
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When Flast is exposed as a fiction, and the true harms it protects against
are understood, Valley Forge should be seen as merely setting the boundary
on how far the fiction will stretch without being pulled apart. The challenge
in Valley Forge stretched the fiction too far because the congressional expenditure of tax funds to purchase the property at issue was made thirty years
prior and it did not aid religion. The allegedly unconstitutional act was in
transferring the property to a religious organization, which was an exercise of
power conferred under the Property Clause, not the Taxing and Spending
Clause. 176 The intervening use of the property, as a military hospital, was
wholly constitutional. When the Taxing and Spending Clause cannot be implicated as the source of power under which the allegedly unconstitutional act
is completed, the Flast fiction tears apart.
In the instant case, there is no intervening use of the money. The money
went directly from Congress to the executive branch, which disbursed it in
the allegedly unconstitutional manner. Therefore, the Court's fiction is not
exposed, and standing can still be found without adopting citizen standing as
a whole. Thus, the narrow exception of Flast can be maintained. In this
analysis, the instant case is not distinguishable from Bowen, where money
was appropriated by Congress, under its taxing and spending power, to the
executive department for disbursement to a religious organization. When the
harm to plaintiffs is understood to be the harm that results when religion enters the political process, the fact that money is earmarked not by Congress,
but by the executive branch, should not be controlling. Thus, the issue of
whether an appropriation violates the Establishment Clause is one that can be
adjudicated on the merits, and Flast'sfiction can be maintained.
Returning to the critique of the majority's holding in the instant case, the
logic of this analysis does not violate the first rule of standing, which is that
standing is an inquiry into whether the proper plaintiff has brought the claim
before the court. The proper plaintiff is the body politic, because they, along
with religion itself, suffer the true harm. The plaintiffs have both injury to
their tax burden as well as the generalized injury of having a body politic
where government is withdrawn from the religious debate. These harms make
the plaintiffs the proper parties to litigate these questions in that branch of
government liberated from the political process: the federal courts.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Flast fiction, that a generalized grievance can give rise to standing
when the constitutional challenge is to a specific restraint on the power of
Congress to tax and spend, is just a slice of citizen standing. It ensures that
financial support of religion by the government can be challenged in federal
court and that the merits of those claims can be adjudicated in the body best
176. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 464 (1982).
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suited to draw a neutral line between church and state. That line is necessary
to determine the extent to which the Establishment Clause prohibits religion
to be drawn into political debate by government to prevent the divisiveness
naturally occurring from such a contest. True and unfettered citizen standing
would be necessary to challenge potential abuses of government power originating from sources other than the Taxing and Spending Clause. While this
Note has argued and identified how citizen standing can and should be justified for alleged violations of the Establishment Clause in particular, such a
drastic departure is unnecessary in the instant case, because the Flast fiction
can be maintained under the facts presented. Therefore, the majority properly
allowed plaintiffs standing to continue their litigation. It remains to be seen
whether the President's program will withstand constitutional scrutiny under
the Establishment Clause, but we can be confident that the Court will be vigilant in its fulfillment of the role James Madison envisioned for it:
If [the first ten amendments] are incorporated into the [C]onstitution, independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a
peculiar manner the guardians of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the
[L]egislative or [E]xecutive; they will be naturally led to resist
every encroachment upon rights expressly
stipulated for in the
77
1
rights.
of
declaration
the
by
[Clonstitution
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177. 1 Annals of Cong. 457 (1789), available at http://memory.loc.gov/cgibin/ampage?collld=llac&fileNane=001/llacOOl.db&recNum=230.
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